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Abstract 
Since the adoption of inflation rate targeting policy, there has been a great concern on the 
effectiveness of monetary policy to curb inflation in South Africa. The effectiveness of the repo rate 
as a policy instrument to control the level of inflation has been widely criticised not only in the South 
African context but also internationally. With the critics pointing out from a substantial lag for 
monetary policy changes to affect inflation to the inability of the policy instrument to effectively 
affect inflation level. In assessing the effectiveness of the monetary policy in South Africa, this paper 
makes use of the structural vector error correction model (SVECM) to characterise the dynamics of 
inflation to monetary policy shocks. The results of the impulse response function obtained from the 
SVECM   found that while positive shocks to monetary policy decrease output but do not decrease 
credit demand and inflation in South Africa.    
JEL classification: E52, C22. 
Keywords: Inflation rate targeting, Policy instruments, Structural Vector Error Correction Model. 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The year 2000 has been marked by the adoption of an inflation targeting framework as the anchor of 
monetary policy of in South Africa. The initial target, decided by the Minister of Finance in 
collaboration with the South African Reserve Bank (SARB), was to  achieve an average inflation rate 
of between six and three percent interval in 2002. The SARB has used the repo rate as the policy 
instrument to control the level of inflation and contain it within the chosen interval. The 
effectiveness of the repo rate as a policy instrument to control the level of inflation has been widely 
criticised not only in the South African context but also internationally. With the critics pointing out 
from a substantial lag for monetary policy changes to affect inflation to the inability of the policy 
instrument to effectively affect inflation level (see Bernanke and Woodford, 1997 and Mishkin, 
2002). Since early 2007 the annual inflation rate in South Africa has evolved outside the interval of 
three to six percent. The continual increase in the repo rate in order to curtail the inflation rate has 
accelerated its trend rather than subduing it. The aim of this study is therefore to assess the extent to 
which the monetary policy tool, namely the repo rate, influences inflation rate in South Africa. This 
paper uses the structural vector error correction (SVEC) model to characterise the dynamics of 
inflation to monetary policy instrument shocks. Furthermore this study also assesses the responses of 
the credit extended to the private sector and the real domestic product (GDP) to monetary policy 
instrument shocks. The remaining of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 the theories and 
literature review on inflation targeting policy. Section 3 discusses the trend of inflation and the 
monetary policy instrument in South Africa. Section 4 discusses the data and methodology of the 
SVEC model. Section 5 focuses on empirical results and discussion on the findings of the paper. 
Section 6 concludes the paper. 
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2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
Inflation rate targeting (IT) was first adopted as monetary policy by the Reserve Bank of New 
Zealand in 1990, followed by the Bank of Canada in 1991, and the Bank of England in 1992. It has 
gained popularity in both industrial countries and emerging economies. To date the number of 
countries following this monetary policy is more than 20.  
Svensson (2007) argues that a successful IT policy is characterized by, (1) an announcement of the 
numerical inflation target, (2) an implementation of monetary policy that gives a major role to an 
inflation forecast, (3) an adoption of short-term interest rates as the only monetary policy instrument, 
and (4) a high degree of transparency and accountability. Proponents of inflation targeting policy 
(Bernanke et al., 1999; Nadal De Simone, 2001; Corbo, Landerretche, and Schmidt-Hebbel, 2002; 
Neumann an von Hagen, 2002; Hyvonen, 2004; IMF, 2005; Vega and Winkerlied, 2005; Mishkin and 
Schmidt-Hebbel, 2007) demonstrate empirically that inflation targeting is associated with an 
improvement in overall economic performance. According to these authors the rational behind this 
success is that by targeting directly price, inflation target plays a role of explicit and a strong nominal 
anchor.  
The application of the IT policy necessitates that the monetary authority announces the numerical 
target (point or interval). The central bank should also set out the period within which inflation will 
reach the target level. Whenever the inflation is outside the target, the central bank uses the short-
term interest rates to bring it back within the target range. Such an explicit mandate requires 
independence of monetary authority, which in turn is accountable for missing the objective. The 
issue of accountability leads to improved communication or transparency with the public through the 
published inflation reports, minutes of monetary policy committee meetings and inflation forecasts 
of central bank econometric models. Without accountability and transparency it is difficult to 
establish credibility, and hence anchor inflation expectations. 
The results of different studies suggest that inflation levels, persistence, and volatility are lower in 
inflation-targeting countries than in nontargeters. Furthermore, output volatility has improved during 
the post-targeting period. Finally, exchange rate pass-through effects have been reduced after the 
adoption of IT. Besides the improvement of economic performance, Johnson (2002, 2003) provides 
strong evidence an immediate fall in inflation expectations after the adoption of IT. Likewise, 
Gürkaynak, Levin, and Swanson (2007); Levin, Natalucci, and Piger (2004); Castelnuovo, Nicoletti-
Altimari, and Palenzuela (2003) argue eloquently that inflation expectations are more anchored for 
targeters than nontargeters, particularly at longer horizons. Consequently, supporters of this view 
claim strongly that monetary policy has become more efficient under inflation-targeting.   
On the other hand, Ball and Sheridan (2005), Roger and Stone (2005), Epstein and Yeldan (2007) 
state that the earlier victory proclaimed by the proponents of IT is still to be tested. Their analysis 
shows that industrialized nontargeters, like targeters, have experienced low inflation and high output 
growth during the same period. Similarly, for the same period their volatility of inflation and output 
growth declined. Hence, one cannot attribute a recent disinflation and increase in output growth 
solely to the success of the IT policy. As Ball and Sheridan (2005) clearly put it, the economic 
environment has been fairy tranquil during the inflation-targeting era, and central banks have not 
been tested severely. Likewise, Rogoff (2007) assigns these benefits to the forces of globalization. To 
support the effectiveness and success of IT, it should be tested during the hostile periods of high 
inflation, such as the current rise in global food and oil prices. 
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3. INFLATION TARGETING IN SOUTH AFRICA 
 
Like many emerging market economies, in the aftermath of the Asian crisis, the South African 
Reserve Bank (SARB) adopted inflation rate targeting as its monetary policy in early 2000. Inflation 
becomes the primary and sole mandate of SARB, with a freely floating exchange rate. Similar to 
many targeters, the adherence to this new monetary policy framework reinforced the SARB 
independence. SARB ascribes to 3-6% target range to be achieved within the two years after its 
adoption. The subsequent characteristics of IT, as explained above, became reality in the South 
African context. To achieve its credibility the SARB has to bring inflation rate within the target range 
by increasing or decreasing its monetary instrument, the repo rate. The repo rate, which represents 
the cost of holding money, is the rate that the SARB charges commercial banks. By using the repo 
rates the SARB controls directly liquidity in the market. For example, if the central bank feels that 
there is excess liquidity in the market, it increases the repo rate to create shortage. The commercial 
banks will react to this contractionary monetary policy by increasing their lending rates. This will 
result in the decrease in the money demand and consequently the total demand. As the total demand 
decreases, the price level will tend to fall.  
Figure 1 shows that inflation rate first reached the target band in August 2001. However, this 
success was short lived, in that the terrorist attack in the US on September 11, combined with 
massive depreciation of South African Rand put high pressure on inflation rate reaching a pick of 
10.5% in October 2002. The SARB reacted by increasing the repo rate (see Figure 2) from December 
2001 to September 2002 where the repo rate increased from 9.5% to 13.5%, respectively. The central 
bank action combined with the investigation committee, initiated by the government in order to 
investigate possibility of speculative attacks against the Rand, helped reduced inflation. Inflation was 
reduced gradually to below 6% in June 2003. The decline in inflation was followed by monetary 
easing up to 8% in December 2003. As depicted in Figure 1, inflation was back in up trend in March 
2005 crossing the 6% limit in June 2007. From June 2006 onward the SARB has followed a 
contractionary policy increasing the repo rate from 7% to 11% in December 2007; that is, an increase 
of 4%. In the same time inflation has increased from 3.9 to 8.6% for the same period. Against this 
background, the question arises as to whether inflation rate targeting has been successful in 
decreasing inflation, following the recent price increase.      
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 Source: Inet-Bridge, Authors estimation 
 
  Figure 1: Inflation (CPIX) 
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Figure 3: Inflation (CPIX) and Repo rate 
 
 
4. METHODOLOGY OF THE SVEC MODEL 
 
In assessing how monetary policy instrument affects inflation in South Africa this paper uses the 
SVEC model to characterise the dynamics of inflation rate to monetary policy instrument shocks. 
The modelling of dynamic behaviour of economic variables, through the impulse response function 
(IRF) analysis, is extensively used in a vector autoregressive (VAR) framework. Nonetheless the VAR 
model is “a-theoretic” and therefore there is little economic content in the results provided from the 
IRF analysis. Like structural vector autoregressive (SVAR) models, the SVEC models provide a 
framework where the results that are obtained from the IRF have an economic meaning. Contrary to 
SVAR models, SVEC models are suitable for identifying economic shocks when cointegration 
relationship exists between variables in the model. SVEC analysis starts from a reduced form 
standard VEC model 
 
tptpttt µyyyαβy +∆Γ++∆Γ+=∆ +−−−− 11111 ...'  (1) 
 
where ty  is a 1×K  vector of time series, 11 −ΓΓ p...  are KK ×  coefficient matrices. The reduced 
form disturbance tµ is a 1×K unobservable zero mean white noise process with covariance 
matrix µΣ . From Johansen’s (1995) version of the Granger’s representation theorem it follows that 
the VEC model has the following moving average representation 
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 and represents the long-run effects of forecast error impulse 
response.  j
j
j LL ∑∞
=
Ξ=Ξ
0
** )(  is an infinite-order polynomial in the lag operator with coefficient 
matrices *jΞ  that tend to zero as .∞→j  It contains transitory effects. The term *0y  contains all 
initial values of the vector time series. The forecast error impulse responses based on Ξ  and the 
)(LΞ are without economic meaning as they are obtained from the reduced form disturbance (see 
Equation 2). Structural shocks need to be identified for a meaningful impulse response analysis. The 
relationship between the reduced-form disturbances and the underlying structural shocks is written as 
follows:  
 
tt εAµ =  (3) 
 
where 1×K  vector tε  contains the unobservable structural shocks and has a covariance of ε∑ . 
Substituting Equation (3) in Equation (2) yield a structural IRF given by AΞ . The long-run effects 
of tε  shocks will therefore be given by AΞ . This matrix has a rank rK − , where r is the 
cointegrating rank of the system. In particular, if the system has r cointegrating relations, )( rKk −=  
shocks have permanent effects, while at most r shocks have transitory effects. To exactly identify 
permanent shocks 21 /)( −kk  additional restrictions (elements of the matrix AΞ  set to zero) are 
needed. Similarly 21 /)( −rr  additional contemporaneous restrictions are needed to identify the 
transitory shocks. Together, these are a total of 21 /)( −KK  restrictions necessary to just identify 
matrix A. 
 
5. DATA AND EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
 
This study employs seasonally unadjusted monthly data for South Africa for the period from 
February 2000 to September 2007. February 2000 corresponds with the official starting of inflation 
targeting policy. In the benchmark specification the VEC model includes the following variables: 
- The natural logarithm  of credit extension (CREDIT)  
- The natural logarithm of manufacturing production used as a proxy for real gross domestic 
product (MANU). Figure A1 shows that the two series present a common trend and may be 
used of a proxy of each other. 
- the JIBAR rate as a proxy for repo rate (INTEREST). Figure shows that the trend of the 
JIBAR rate corresponds to the repo rate. We prefer to use the JIBAR rate as its time series is 
continuous compared to the repo rate that is close to a discrete series. Figure A1  shows that 
they have a common trend. 
- the natural logarithm of consumer price index for metropolitan areas (PRICE). 
The series are sourced from the South African Reserve Bank (SARB) database. Table A1 in the 
Appendix presents the unit root test of all the variables. All the variables are integrated of order one, 
I (1). This was tested with the Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) test whereby a trend was included in 
the test for the series CREDIT and MANU and only constant was included for INTEREST and 
PRICE. 
As the SVEC analysis necessitates that variables be cointegrated and that the number of 
cointegrating relationship be known for the identification of shocks, Table A2 presents the trace test 
statistics. For the testing procedure the Johansen trace test was used. The number of autoregressive 
lags in the system chosen according to the Akaike Information Criteria is two. Table A2 indicates 
that there is existence of two cointegrating relationships in the system. 
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The vector of structural shocks in this study is given as ( )',,, INTERSTCREDITMANUt ttPRICEtt εεεεε = . As in 
section 4, for a 4-variable VEC we need 621 =− /)(KK   linearly independent restrictions to exactly 
identify the structural shocks. Since we have two cointegrating relations (r = 2), the number of 
shocks with permanent effects are 2=−= rKk . A total of 2 shocks will have permanent effects, 
whereas 2=r  shocks have transitory effects.  In our 4-variable VEC model we assume that only 
shocks in CREDIT will not have permanent effects. To identify the three permanent shocks, 
121 =− /)(kk  additional restriction is imposed in the long-run impact matrix AΞ . So we will 
assume in addition that productivity is only driven by technology shocks, MANUε .  
The identification of the long run matrix AΞ  in the 4-variable system is as follows: 
 
⎟⎟
⎟⎟
⎟
⎠
⎞
⎜⎜
⎜⎜
⎜
⎝
⎛
=Ξ
00
00
00
000
**
**
**
*
A          (4) 
Unrestricted elements are indicated by asterisk. Referring to the vector of structural shock above, 
the interpretation of the above matrix is that shocks to PRICE have no long run effects on MANU, 
CREDIT or INTEREST. Also shocks to INTEREST have no long-run effects on MANU, 
CREDIT and PRICE. The rational behind the interpretations is that nominal variables such as price 
and interest should not influence economic activity in the long term. Another interpretation from 
this matrix, as discussed above, is that productivity is only driven by technology shocks, MANUε , and 
not any other shock.  
As said earlier we need 6 linearly independent restrictions to exactly identify the structural shocks. 
But as it stands now the two zero columns represent 4=kr linearly independent restrictions and the 
zeros in (4) represent only five linearly independent restrictions. We then need in addition 
121 =− /)(rr contemporaneous restriction to unravel the effects of the two transitory shocks. The 
one additional restriction is therefore reported in the contemporaneous or short term matrix A. The 
choice made is that shocks to PRICE do not contemporaneously affect INTEREST. There should 
be a lag effect, especially in the case of South Africa. The short run matrix is therefore represented as 
 
⎟⎟
⎟⎟
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⎞
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⎜⎜
⎜
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=
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****
****
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A  
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6. INTERPRETATION OF THE RESULTS 
 
Figure 3   provides the responses of MANU, PRICE, INTEREST and CREDIT to shocks from 
interest rate. Confidence intervals for the impulse responses are bootstrapped by procedure 
described in Breitung, Bruggeman, and Lutkepohl (2004). Bootstrap from percentile method 
proposed by Hall (1992) is used to construct the 95% confidence interval. 
 
 
------ 95% Hall Percentile confidence interval     ____ SVEC impulse responses 
 
Figure 3: SVEC responses of MANU, PRICE, INTEREST and CREDIT to shocks from interest rate  
 
 
The first row of Figure 3 shows the response of MANU to interest rate shocks. A positive shock 
to interest increases total production for the first 6 to 7 months. The negative response of total 
production to interest rate shocks occurs after 9 months. This expected effect actually occurs after a 
short term lag. This finding is in line with the outcome of a number of researches concerning the 
response of output to monetary policy shocks. In actual fact, recent research on monetary 
transmission confirms that monetary policy actions affect output in the short-run (Levin, Natalucci, 
and Piger , 2004). While output is quicker to respond to monetary policy, price displays inertial 
behaviour and remains largely unaffected for almost one year or even more. Movement in real output 
are not only substantial but also long-lived with the effect remaining up to 3 years (Friedman and 
Schwartz, 1963; Romer and Romer, 1989). 
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The second row shows the response of PRICE to interest rate shocks. A positive shock to interest 
rate increases PRICE for more than 18 months and for a period of at least 20 months there is no 
evidence that PRICE is likely to decrease after a positive monetary policy shock. These realities point 
to the possibility that either positive monetary shocks is unable to cause a decrease in inflation or that 
there is substantial lag in the effect of monetary policy on PRICE. Whichever the case may be, this 
points to the ineffectiveness of monetary policy instrument in affecting inflation in South Africa.  
This finding is supported by the recent work by Gupta and Komen (2008) using the Granger 
causality framework. The inability of the monetary policy shocks to influence the level of inflation 
raises a concern on the success of monetary policy stance. This apprehension is echoed by Jean-
Claude Trichet, the president of the European Central Bank (ECB), remarking that central banks do 
their best work when their threats to raise interest rate deter inflation actions1. While a continuous 
increase in interest rate is not capable to reverse an increasing trend in inflation but succeed to 
depress economic growth, there is enough reason that the conduct of monetary policy be questioned 
in South Africa. A change of monetary policy stance from a simple inflation targeting to a dual target 
of inflation and employment (output growth), as applied in the USA, may be an option for bolstering 
monetary policy in South Africa. Why should the SARB continuously increase interest rate that has a 
neutral effect on inflation but compromises the growth path of the country? Even though many are 
of the opinion that the current increasing trend in inflation in South Africa is due to the increase in 
the petrol and food prices, without which inflation rate would be in the range of 5% (Mboweni, 
2008), this should not be an excuse for the observed failure of the current monetary policy stance to 
steer back inflation within the target. Inflation targeting policy evokes an escape clause to justify a 
temporary inability of the monetary authority to contain inflation within the target. Nonetheless the 
escape clause is justified only if inflation is influenced by external shocks, such as petrol price. 
Altogether, it is warranted that the public question the effectiveness of inflation targeting policy in 
South Africa. 
The third row shows the response of CREDIT from monetary policy shocks. There is slightly 
positive response of CREDIT to positive monetary policy shocks. This shows that an increase in 
interest rate is in general not effective enough to decrease the demand for credit in South Africa. 
Credit extension is at certain degree insensitive to high interest rate. It is evident that from Figure A1 
that credit growth has been in an uptrend despite a continuous increase in interest rates. An increase 
in the repo rate of 1.5 percentage point, from June 2006 until March 2007, was matched by an 
increase in credit to private sector, for the same period, of 24.5 percentage point. This situation 
should also point out to the ineffectiveness of the repo rate as monetary policy instrument in South 
Africa. Actually, the very important channel through which repo rate should influence inflation is 
through credit demand which in turn affects total demand and then the price level. The institution of 
the new National Credit Act (NCA) as an additional measure to regulate the credit market in South 
Africa has proven to be effective as a complement to monetary policy. The NCA regulates the 
grating of consumer credit by all credit providers, including banks, microlenders, and retailers, to 
both enhance consumer protection and bolster banks’ ability to manage their exposure to individual 
households risks (IMF, 2007). 
The last row shows the response of INTEREST to its own shocks. The effect of interest rate to its 
own shocks has a tendency to be persistent. The effect dies out only in a period of 18 months. This 
provides evidence that initial increase in the repo rate has been followed by subsequent increases in 
the repo rate during the period of analysis. The results as provided in Figure 3 question the 
effectiveness of monetary policy in curbing inflation in South Africa. The positive effect of inflation 
to positive monetary policy shocks should be cause of concern for the monetary policy instrument 
used by the SARB. As from the observation in Figure 3 the persistence of the positive response of 
inflation to monetary policy shocks and the substantial lag before the effect dies out, all should be a 
cause of concern for the ability of the monetary policy instrument.  
                                                 
1 From the article titled “ECB likely to hold rates steady and enjoy the gap” published in the Sunday time 
newspaper of  9 March 2008. 
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7 CONCLUSION 
 
There is an increasing debate amongst academic, policymakers, and the general public as to whether 
inflation rate targeting is an effective monetary policy. In South Africa, the central bank has 
embarked in monetary tightening for more than a year, but it has been unable to bring inflation back 
to the target band. This study endeavoured to assess the effectiveness of monetary policy instrument, 
the repo rate, in influencing inflation rate in South Africa since the adoption of inflation rate 
targeting. The framework used is the structural vector error correction model that facilitates the 
analysis of the dynamics of inflation to monetary policy instrument shocks. This study found that 
positive monetary policy shocks are unable to negatively affect inflation after a period of more than 
20 months. This pointed to the ineffectiveness monetary policy in affecting inflation in South Africa. 
Similarly, monetary policy in South Africa seems less potent in curbing demand for money, though 
this should be an important channel through which monetary policy should affect inflation. These 
facts prove that economic agents in South Africa are to a large extent insensitive to short-term 
interest rates. Credit demand by the private sector remains immune to central bank policy. However, 
this study shows that monetary policy does affect the real output in South Africa. A positive 
monetary policy shock decreases manufacturing production after six to seven months.  The study 
concludes that   inflation rate targeting as applied in South Africa does not help to curb inflation and 
credit demand by the private sector remains immune to central bank policy. The study then suggests 
that like in the USA, a dual inflation and employment (real output) target may be an option to 
consider for monetary policy in a developing country such as South Africa. 
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APPENDIX A 
 
 
Table A1: Unit root test at the level 
    
Series Adjusted t-statistics 
Price -0.642 
Credit 7.273 
Interest -2.059 
Manu -0.458 
ADF is Augmented Dickey-Fuller test where the null hypothesis is of a unit root in the series. The 
estimated regressions include a constant and a trend. 
 
 
 
 
Table A2: Johansen cointegration test 
 
          
Null Hypothesis Number 
of CE Eigenvalue Trace Statistics 5% Critical Value Probability 
None* 0.310 79.692 63.876 0.001 
At most 1* 0.288 46.721 42.915 0.020 
At most 2 0.121 16.523 25.872 0.451 
At most 3 0.055 5.045 12.518 0.590 
 Trace test indicates 2 cointegrating eqn(s) at the 5% level 
 * denotes rejection of the hypothesis at the 5% level 
 **MacKinnon-Haug-Michelis (1999) p-values 
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